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ABSTRACT

After the development and distinctions of the concept of deindividuation are given, a single dimension of morally relevant behavior is outlined with aggression and altruism viewed as the two extremes. This dimension is divided according to degree of external reinforcement control. The result is a 2x2 scheme for classifying morally relevant behavior as either aggression or altruism and as either instrumental or noninstrumental. A review of needed distinctions in deindividuation research includes the proposal versus antisocial consequences of deindividuation, sensible versus senseless deviance, the prosocial consequences of individuation, and sanctioned versus nonsanctioned aggression. These facets of deindividuation research are superimposed on the classification matrix, suggesting that one's state of individuation or deindividuation influences the probability of his behavior falling into one of the four categories. It is concluded that the present organization of these ideas suggest a strategy for making it more likely that people will behave well on their own. (Author/BW)

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDIVIDUATION AND DEINDIVIDUATION:

TOWARD THE INTEGRATION OF AGGRESSION, ALTRUISM, AND MORALLY

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The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, to elaborate the basic assumptions and concepts of an emerging model of behavior centered around the concepts of individuation and deindividuation. Second, to briefly review some of the highlights of the research done on this dimension to date. In so doing I shall note the important findings and criticisms, and raise some unanswered questions in areas in need of further research and clarification. Third, to suggest how the notions of individuation and deindividuation might serve as elements along with other key concepts from social psychology to move us toward a more comprehensive view of morally relevant behavior than is now available, putting together aggression and altruism as a single dimension of moral behavior. The focus of my remarks is on aggressive behavior, although the ideas can be extrapolated to encompass positive forms of social behavior as well.

The phenomenon of human aggression has generated much discussion about the nature of man's hostility and the consequences of it. At times differing views regarding the origin and nature of man's aggressiveness and the conditions which contribute to it have resulted in intense argument (Bandura, 1973; Johnson, 1972; Kaufmann, 1970; Montagu, 1968). Nevertheless, in the midst of this continuing debate we seem to have little clear scientific understanding of the conditions which facilitate aggressive behavior or of ways to minimize it and promote altruism and prosocial behavior. Thus a more complete understanding of the determinants of aggression and altruism and clear evidence concerning the conditions which facilitate

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or retard their expression would be of social and theoretical value.

It should be stated at the outset that aggressive behavior is so diverse in the forms it can take that one can hardly hope to speak to the full range of behavior labeled antisocial, aggressive, violent, or destructive. The bombardier dropping a bomb on the targets below is quite unlike the thief who kills someone in order to get money or the angry parent beating a child. The intrapsychic and interpersonal forces contributing to each of these are probably quite different from one another. Yet, with some broad theorizing and some delineation of types of acts into categories representative of prototypical forms of aggression, these diverse behaviors might be brought together under a larger conceptual umbrella. It is hoped that the present commentary will facilitate this kind of integration.

It should also be noted at the outset that at present deindividuation theory is a loose and large conceptual net related to a variety of social-psychological concepts, and is not yet an unambiguous and rigorous set of postulates, correlates, and predictions. This loose property is at once a strength and weakness, since it allows it both to be connected to a large set of other ideas yet lacks detailed rigor. Only further research will tell whether the theory is genuinely useful for either broad directional statements or specific predictions.

Individuation and Deindividuation

In his classic book Escape from Freedom, Erich Fromm used the concept of individuation to refer to the gradual emerging of individuals (with their own self-awareness and sense of personal uniqueness) over long periods of history. He proposed that at the dawn of mankind there was little differentiation between people's concepts of themselves and their concepts of nature. In addition, there were primitive tribal ties and rites which helped to reduce the individual's sense of uniqueness and freedom. Fromm proposed that in this primitive state

people were both happy and innocent because they were free from the burdensome sense of responsibility and competence that goes along with self identity. Hence, their existence could be described as childlike.

Fromm himself describes a parallel process, which he also labels "individuation," in which the child, originally at one with the mother and having no responsibility, gradually emerges as a unique being and develops a sense of separateness from her. Eventually the child becomes both separate and free from its mother. Fromm characterized this quality of individuation as part of the core human existence. Two correlaries that went along with Fromm's notion are that people are both free and have responsibility, i.e., if man has emerged as separate from his primary ties (whatever form they are postulated to take) then he has gained freedom from those ties regulating his behavior, and has therefore acquired responsibility for his own behavior.

In a more recent conceptual article, Ziller (1964) related the concept of deindividuation to conditions of ego diffusion, in which the individual has difficulty distinguishing his own uniqueness out of an amorphous and obscure self-portrayal. In contrast with this, individuation was defined as "a person's subjective mapping of the social world, in which self is differentiated to a greater or lesser degree from the other social objects in the field. Although individuation is subjective in nature, objective conditions are presumed to influence the person's sense of individuation. Thus a person's reactions with respect to individuation vary inversely with the number of bits of information necessary to locate him or himself unequivocally within a group of persons; that is, the greater number of bits of information required to locate the person, the greater the degree of deindividuation (p. 345)."

The first appearances of the concept of deindividuation as the basis for research was in a report by Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952), who used the

term to refer to a state of affairs in which "individuals are not seen or paid attention to as individuals," or in which group members "do not feel that they stand out as individuals," Under such conditions people are not singling out any particular other person for attention.

An underlying hypothesis elaborated by Zimbardo (1969) is that people have a tendency to engage in certain behaviors which are denied expression because they conflict with the established norms of social appropriateness. These behaviors may be negative or antisocial, characterized as "selfish, greedy, power-seeking, lustful, hostile, destructive," or they may be more positive behaviors which "normally are not expressed overtly, such as intense feelings of happiness or sorrow, or open love for others (p. 251)." In either case these behaviors are held in check by learned concern for how others would react to their expression and by the self-observing aspect of one's conscience. Under these conditions a person is individuated, socially responsible for his actions, and concerned with the morality of his behavior.

Deindividuation is hypothesized to be a condition which facilitates the release of these normally inhibited behaviors, allowing their expression. This disinhibition should occur when people feel free from the restraints of socially established norms and concern for social evaluation. Thus emotions and impulses usually under cognitive control are more likely to be expressed under conditions which minimize self-observation and evaluation as well as concern over evaluation by others. Under these deindividuating conditions people are less inhibited and are able to indulge in forms of behavior in which they otherwise would not indulge.

Zimbardo (1969) has proposed the most elaborate model of deindividuation that has appeared to date. His model includes several input variables, mediating inferred subjective changes, and several characteristics of the output behaviors. The input variables are the conditions of deindividuation or the conditions which

stimulate it. The most studied of these include anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, and increased group size (Diener, 1974). The feeling or state of deindividuation--the inferred subjective changes associated with the deindividuating conditions--includes a minimization of "self-observation-evaluation" and of concern for social evaluation. These in turn lead to a weakening of time based controls of guilt, shame, fear, and commitment, and the result is a lowered threshold for expressing normally inhibited behaviors. The deindividuated output behaviors are characterized as emotional, impulsive, of high intensity, difficult to terminate, repetitive, self-reinforcing, and amplified with repeated expressions. It was Zimbardo's systemization which led to the explosion of research on deindividuation, with the consequent bulk of research done on the relation between deindividuation and aggression.

A key element in the dimension we are dealing with is the degree of personal uniqueness or differentness, and it makes sense that this is related to other social-psychological concepts. Maslach (1974) has made some important distinctions in this regard by relating deindividuation as a coherent theory of differentness to the concepts of deviancy, conformity, and identity as follows: The sociological concept of deviancy is often regarded as negative and carries with it the connotation of rule breaking, so that those who violate institutional norms receive negative consequences in some form of punishment. Even though this is largely a statistical definition, it turns out to be correct in practical affairs. If behaving differently from others is seen as negative and often results in punishment, then it follows that people will often behave like others in order to avoid negative consequences. This is exactly what the research on conformity has shown (Kiesler & Kiesler, 1971). On the other hand, people do not always conform, and often assert their own identity and make themselves different and unique from

others--as when people express their individuality through deviant hair styles or unusual clothing (or lack of it as may be the case with streaking). Maslach (1974) has pinpointed this paradox of why people at once want to be like others yet unlike them, and has indicated that what is lacking is "a coherent theory of the dynamics of differentness, which could explain why there are times when people want to be different from others and times when they want to be similar to them (p. 413)." She points out that this is provided by the theory of individuation and deindividuation, and her research supported Ziller's (1964) hypothesis that in a safe environment people strive to express their unique identity, whereas in a punitive or threatening environment people try to deindividuate themselves and make themselves anonymous--in order to decrease the chances of being singled out for punishment.

However, it should be pointed out that even though this latter formulation seems partially correct, it does not account for all phenomena to which it is related. People at times make themselves distinct and unique in order to protest a societal wrong or defend a position when the environment is very threatening and has a high probability of bringing punishment. In cases such as these it is not enough to say simply that the potential rewards that the individual expects outweigh the costs, since that kind of analysis essentially describes events already observed. It does not provide a way of differentiating between those situations in which a person will seek identity versus anonymity even in the face of a large threat of punishment, which, of course, is what is needed.

Most of the research on deindividuation has been on the relation between deindividuation and aggression, and has only indirectly been related to positive forms of social behavior. It is to this dimension that we turn next.

Morally Relevant Behavior: Instrumental and Noninstrumental

The dimension of morally relevant behavior can be seen as having two polar

extremes: aggression and altruism. The research on each has largely been conducted at its own end of the spectrum as an independent problem. It is proposed that each of these be viewed as one end of the single dimension of morally relevant behavior.

AGGRESSION

By far the most influential theoretical view of aggression has been the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Its basic postulate is that the occurrence of frustration, defined as the blocking of an instigated goal response, "always leads to some form of aggression," and that "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration (p. 1)." The person is assumed to be in a relatively quiescent (or at least nonaggressive) state until the frustration occurs; and only then is his tendency towards aggression increased.

In recent years the original frustration-aggression formula has been elaborated and modified by Berkowitz (1964, 1965, 1969). His revised frustration-aggression formula stresses the point that the occurrence of frustration creates only a readiness to aggress corresponding to the inner mediating state of anger arousal. For aggressive behavior to actually occur there must also be present violence-associated stimulus cues which act as external triggers and elicit or release the aggressive reaction from the aroused individual. Berkowitz's argument is that the presence of appropriate aggressive cues increases the probability that anger arousal will be actualized as aggressive behavior, and his view is typified in the investigations of the weapons effect (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967).

In both the original frustration-aggression hypothesis and Berkowitz's revised model the tension level of the organism is presumed to be increased by some frustrating circumstance. This in turn increases the organism's tendency to aggress; the aggressive response is "pushed out" onto the target by emotional

excitation. Berkowitz's revised formulation adds that the aggressive response is also "pulled out" from the organism by appropriate stimulus cues (Berkowitz, 1969).

One limitation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is that it is one-sided, i.e., it assumes that aggressive behavior occurs because there is an increased motivation to aggress. However, another way to produce aggression would be simply to reduce the restraining forces that normally restrict or inhibit the expression of aggression, thus allowing it to be released. A theoretical model for this latter approach centers around the concept of deindividuation.

Lewin (1951) wrote that the aggression level of groups could be conceived of as a quasi-stationary equilibrium. According to Lewin the aggression level at any moment was determined by (1) forces toward aggression and (2) restraining forces which tended to inhibit aggression. The aggression level could be raised by either increasing the forces toward aggression or by lowering the restraining forces that held it in check. In either case the aggression would be expressed, but the former was characterized by relatively high tension, whereas the latter was characterized by relatively low tension.

This same model can be applied to individuals, with the probability of aggression for the individual fluctuating as a quasi-stationary equilibrium. Just as for groups, the model for individuals contains forces towards aggression (frustration, pain, provocation, insult, etc.) as well as restraining forces (fear of punishment, individuation). According to the model, aggression may be produced by either frustration or the removal of restraining forces, as suggested by the theory of deindividuation.

The question of one's intent to harm has been a central issue in other discussions of aggression (Buss, 1961; Feshbach, 1964; Kaufmann, 1970). For example,

if someone delivers noxious stimuli accidentally or simply as punishment, we ordinarily do not say that he is aggressing. We can infer an intent to aggress only after examining the stimuli antecedent to the response and its consequences (Buss, 1971). If it appears that the delivery of noxious stimuli was accidental or that the degree of punishment inflicted was in line with that which is expected of the person's social role, then it would not be called aggressive. If, on the other hand, the punishment was clearly directed at the target and its intensity exceeded that expected from the initiator's social role, then the property of aggressiveness could be attributed to the act.

Social-psychological experiments are often criticized for their operational definitions of aggression. Typically the subject is given a sanctioned opportunity to deliver a noxious stimulus (usually electric shock) to another person. Also, there are usually demand characteristics operating so that the subject is expected to respond in this way. Thus it can be argued that such responses should not be called aggressive. In the usual experiment, however, subjects are given a range of aversive responses that they can make if they want to, some of which are more intense than others. In order to comply with the demand characteristics of the experimental setting, the subject need respond only with the lowest level of stimulation. But subjects do respond with the high levels of stimulation and deliver punishment more intense than is warranted by their social role. According to Buss (1971) such behavior meets the criterion for the definition of aggression.

One important distinction to keep in mind is Feshbach's (1964) classification of types of aggression according to their controlling factors. One type is instrumental aggression, for which the act is performed in order to achieve some other nonaggressive goal. This type of aggression can be called "sensible,"

since the act is performed in exchange for tangible reinforcement, and not simply for "kicks," because it is pleasurable, or for the destructive consequences themselves. To be contrasted with this is what Feshbach calls hostile aggression, in which the role of reinforcers is secondary, and the goal is injury to the target. The action may be anger mediated or emotional in character. This in part is what is meant by my labeling it "senseless" violence. This distinction is important in our efforts to control aggression. If aggressive behavior is under reinforcement control, then in order to control it we must simply change the contingencies. If it is not, then alternate strategies are required. It is this latter situation to which the concepts of individuation and deindividuation speak.

ALTRUISM

To turn to the positive side of the coin, the problem of clearly identifying altruism is no less difficult than that of identifying aggression: in both cases there is constant confusion between motivational versus purely behavioral definitions. On the motivational side, some argue that an act should not be considered altruistic unless the actor is not getting some form of reinforcement from it. In other words, an act, however helpful or socially beneficial it may be, would not be an altruistic one unless it is totally non-self rewarding. But those of a Machiavellian or Hobesian tradition are quick to argue that there is, therefore, no such thing as pure altruistic behavior, since even when a person does something good he reaps feelings of well-being and a positive or enhanced self esteem. This kind of characterization of prosocial behavior does nothing to help differentiate between alternate bases of prosocial behavior, and it in fact obscures important differences. For example, one person may help another and gain no tangible reinforcement from it (though he may feel good about himself), while another person may help

someone because of social pressure--even though he may not want to, while yet another may do so because it is his job--as in the case of a fireman or medical doctor. Simply saying that all these people behave well because they are reinforced for it does not go a long way in helping to differentiate the factors responsible for these alternate forms of prosocial behavior.

People of this persuasion would not label an act altruistic because positive self esteem in a reward. It is obvious that some prosocial behavior is under external reinforcement control, but this is certainly not the case in what is probably the classic story of altruism, the story of the Good Samaritan:

"And who is my neighbor?" Jesus replied, "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down the road; and when he saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had compassion, and went to him and bound his wounds, pouring on oil and wine; then he set him on his own beast and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, "Take care of him; and whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I come back." Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to him who fell among the robbers? He said, "The one who showed mercy on him." And Jesus said to him, "Go and do likewise." (Luke 10:29-37, RSV).

It is reasonable to infer that the Good Samaritan felt good about himself after having performed his helpful act. Is it necessary to deny him this self-esteem? When we look at his actions, we ask "What is good about the Good Samaritan?"

The answer seems to be that he did something contravening social mores (or at least what was expected of a despised Samaritan) without tangible reinforcement and at personal cost. In this context, the goodness is attributed to the person rather than the environment.

It is clear that the dynamics underlying positive forms of social behavior can be classified in ways paralleling those for antisocial behavior. In neither case is it enough to provide a single, global characterization. Rather, it is imperative that the specific behavior in question be characterized along with its controlling variables. In both cases the behavior can be instrumental and performed for profit, or it can be noninstrumental and performed for the sheer pleasure of it.

In our attempts to characterize the dynamics of morally relevant behavior, two orthogonal dimensions seem to emerge: The first is the dimension of morally relevant behavior, with aggression and altruism as the two polar extremes. Though in past research efforts these have in general been treated separately, many of the same variables have been studied and shown to influence both. These include group effects, target characteristics, and actor responsibility (Diener, 1974; Krebs, 1970; Macaulay & Berkowitz, 1970). Therefore, it is proposed that these be integrated into a single dimension, rather than be treated separately; for when the probability of one is increased, the probability of the other is decreased.

Orthogonal to the aggression-altruism dimension is the instrumental vs. noninstrumental nature of the behavior, and there emerges a 2 x 2 classification of behavior as either prosocial or antisocial and as either instrumental or noninstrumental. The resulting four categories are instrumental aggression, noninstrumental aggression, instrumental altruism, and noninstrumental altruism (Table 1).

Insert Table 1 about here

Note that all that has been done is the putting together of aggression and altruism at opposite ends of a spectrum, and then dividing that in half according to degree of external reinforcement control. Whether or not these prototypical forms occur in their pure form, this classification matrix can serve as a useful guide to further explorations or discussions.

The concepts of individuation and deindividuation are related to the behavioral forms depicted in Table 1. As outlined by Zimbardo (1969) the model implies that its components, which influence one's state of individuation, make more or less probable the forms of behavior outlined in the matrix. This point can be illustrated through a look at some of the research on deindividuation.

Deindividuation Research: Some Needed Distinctions

In reviewing some of the key points of the research on deindividuation I shall not attempt to be comprehensive. That much needed task has been accomplished by Diener (1974). Rather, the intent is to be selective yet representative, focusing on some aspects of the research which seem to be trouble spots. There are four such points of confusion which seem to have surfaced:

First, a distinction must be made between the prosocial versus antisocial consequences of deindividuation. Although Zimbardo's (1969) model allows for the release of both positive and negative forms of behavior, stating that it is "characterized as selfish, greedy, power-seeking, hostile, lustful, and destructive..." as well as "...positive' behaviors...such as intense feelings of happiness or sorrow, and open love for others (p. 251)," most of the investigations conducted so far have focused on the antisocial consequences such as aggression (Diener, Westford, Dineen, & Fraser, 1973; Paloutzian, 1972; Watson, 1973; Zimbardo, 1969), theft (Diener, Westford, Diener, & Beaman, 1973; Fraser, Kelem, Diener, & Beaman, 1973) and use of obscene language (Cannavale, Scarr, & Pepitone,

1970; Festinger et al., 1952; Singer, Brush, & Lublin, 1965).

Of all the studies of the consequences of deindividuation, there appears to be only one (Gergen, Gergen, & Barton, 1973) dealing with the hypothesized positive consequences, and its interpretation is open to question. In this study, when college students came to the laboratory they were placed in a completely dark chamber with several other students. Subjects were not allowed to see each other either before or after the session, but were escorted to and from the chamber individually, one at a time. A similar group was run in the lighted room. The data indicated the deindividuation or anonymity produced by the darkened room resulted in more touching and hugging, greater feelings of sexual arousal, greater feelings of "closeness," and a heightened sensation of freedom and pleasure. Gergen et al. interpret this to mean that deindividuation increases the probability of whatever behavior is salient in a given situation, not necessarily antisocial behavior. They write "Anonymity itself does not seem to be a social ill. Rather, the state of anonymity seems to encourage whatever potentials are most prominent at the moment--whether for good or ill. When we are anonymous we are free to be aggressive or to give affection, whichever expresses most fully our feelings at the time. There is liberation in anonymity (p. 130)."

Gergen et al. claim that darkness released intimacy by stating "With the simple subtraction of light, a group of perfect strangers moved within approximately 30 minutes to a stage of intimacy often not attained in years of normal acquaintanceship (p. 130)." This seems to be a peculiar interpretation, and it is open to question. Two additional findings are reported which suggest alternate interpretations. First, the dark-room subjects indicated that they were less

anxious to be known by others, and less anxious to know the identity of others. This finding suggests that the kind of "intimacy" that developed in the dark room is different from that which occurs under normal circumstances, in which people would desire to know and be known by others, rather than the reverse. Second, Gergen et al. report that some subjects began to neck and play "touchy body," and that they then split up and paired off with others in order to share their "love." These findings do not appear to reflect the normal conception of intimacy, and probably represent "fooling around" by college undergraduates in that setting, rather than genuine intimacy. Clearly some form of behavior normally under social control was released in the darkness, but it is difficult to pinpoint its precise character.

It is still an open question whether positive social behavior is released in a manner similar to the release of antisocial behavior, and whether the hypothesized positive consequences should even be described with the same adjectives. At present it is questionable whether the attempt should be made to integrate this facet of deindividuation research into the 2 x 2 classification.

Second, one confusing aspect of past research has been the multiple usage of the concept of deindividuation together with different forms of antisocial deviance. Some of the researchers characterize deindividuation as a loss of cognitive regulation of behavior resulting in behavior that is "out of control," "wild," or "crazy." This is indeed the way Zimbardo talked of the deindividuation process when using words such as emotional, impulsive, etc. This form of deviance might be labeled "senseless" or "mindless" deviance, since it is noncognitively mediated and results in no tangible reinforcement. A real world example of this form of "senseless" violence is vandalism.

One notion intimately related to this conception of deindividuation is that social rules, laws, past learnings, fear of punishment, etc. are able to have some regulating influence over our behavior because we have a sense of time perspective, i.e., without a sense of past and future, these things which regulate behavior through time themes would have no way of influencing what we do. In such a condition we would always be living in the "here and now"--moment by moment. It follows that if we are submerged in the "here and now" we will be more reactive to present stimuli, and our behavior will be less under the control of those cognitively mediated behavior regulators--liberated from cognitive controls to become chaotic in the way Zimbardo (1969) characterized it.

This "senseless" consequences of deindividuation is in contrast to other consequences of deindividuating manipulations which may be called "sensible." This other approach to the character of deindividuation is the "cognitively mediated cue for sensible deviance" approach. This view does not assume that the essential character of deindividuation involves the "here and now" impulsive and irrational style of deviant behavior. Rather, it simply proposes that the effect of deindividuating conditions is simply to provide discriminative cues that occasion behaviors normally out of order, and that such behavior when performed is reinforced. An example of this kind of "sensible" deviance is theft, which seems to be deliberate, planned, organized, and executed with great self control and self observation--the precise qualities that Zimbardo hypothesized to characterize individuated behavior. The same process has been hypothesized to account for both crazy, wild, and emotional behavior as well as behavior requiring prior planning and deliberate personal control.

It should be noted that this distinction is not as clear as one might hope, since theft is sometimes done impulsively and people can plan to vandalize. Yet

they are conceptually two distinct forms of behavior with different determinants, and the distinction should be made both theoretically and operationally when the consequences of deindividuation are being investigated. Both forms of antisocial deviance have been studied as a function of deindividuation input variables such as anonymity, removal or diffusion of responsibility, and group presence or coaction, but the distinction has not been made clear, and the alternate forms of the output behaviors have been treated as if they are a result of the same mediating process. Each of these two types of deindividuation corresponds to one cell of our moral behavior classification scheme. The mindless form of deindividuation facilitates noninstrumental aggression, and the cue for deviance form of deindividuation facilitates instrumental aggression.

Third, if socially negative actions are hypothesized to be consequences of deindividuation, then the implication is that responsible and altruistic actions would be made more likely by conditions that individuate people. The relationship between individuation and prosocial behavior is almost totally devoid of direct investigation. It was touched upon by Paloutzian (1972) in a laboratory experiment in which subjects who were individuated by being alone and being made to feel responsible tended to behave altruistically. In that experiment the most individuated subjects helped a target person win a prize.

These results are in accord with the research on the social responsibility norm by Bakowitz and Daniels (1963). These investigators found that subjects who could affect another's winning a prize by working hard on a task worked harder than subjects who could have no such effect, even though they received nothing for it themselves. Also consistent with these findings are the results of a study by Tilker (1970), in which persons who were made to feel responsible for the safety and well-being of the victim in a simulated Milgram situation were the

most likely to react responsibly and interrupt the proceedings. Thus there is support for the notion that conditions which produce a sense of individuation, responsibility, and identification increase the probability that a person will behave in an altruistic or positive fashion, but at this point the evidence is very scanty. These findings come closest to what people usually mean by "pure" altruism, and correspond to what I have been calling noninstrumental altruism in the 2 x 2 schema for moral behavior.

Fourth, crucial to the discussion of aggression is the distinction between sanctioned versus nonsanctioned aggression. Curiously enough, though most researchers make statements about real world nonsanctioned aggression, their research has been done on laboratory sanctioned aggression. In the typical laboratory experiment there are usually factors present which essentially tell the subject that it is O.K. to aggress. Two such factors are most common, and sometimes both are present: These are demand characteristics and direct instructions. When subjects come to the psychology laboratory, the implication is that they are not there to do nothing, and that they are expected to do something (or else they would not be subjects in an experiment). They are often given some shock buttons or tone buttons to push and thus deliver stimulation to a target person, or are shown a convenient pile of wiffle balls, newspaper wads, rubber bands, plastic bricks, etc. to be thrown at some person incapable of retaliation. Often the demand is clear that the subject is expected to push the buttons or throw the material, or else he is told specifically to do it. In this latter case the investigation may actually be closer to obedience research than aggression or deindividuation research, and is most closely though not directly related to what I have been referring to as instrumental, in that the locus of control is outside the individual.

Conclusion

Finally it should be summarized how the theory of deindividuation is related to our 2 x 2 classification of behavior as either aggressive or altruistic and as either instrumental or noninstrumental. The relationships are at this stage only working and theoretical, and require further empirical support.

If we superimpose on the 2 x 2 matrix the various forms of individuation and deindividuation together with their correlated forms of behavior, then certain points along the individuation-deindividuation dimension fit in to certain cells in the matrix, so that one's condition of individuation or deindividuation effects the chances of his behavior falling into one of the four categories. Conditions which individuate people are hypothesized to increase the probability of their behaving altruistically, and such positive action can be either under direct reinforcement control or not. In either case, making people feel unique and identifiable makes it more likely that they will behave well, though it is desirable to remove the necessity for reinforcement so that people can behave well on their own.

Deindividuation was referred to in two senses: the "cue for deviance" sense and the "lack of cognitive control" sense, and these correspond to instrumental aggression and noninstrumental aggression respectively. By placing people in context in which they are anonymous we may be providing a signal indicating that deliberate and unlawful acts may be performed without punishment. On the other hand, deindividuating conditions which induce a lack of cognitive control allow for noninstrumental aggression and the type of mindless or wild release of behavior described by Zimbardo (1969).

Reinforcement is a good way to get people to perform specific acts, but since such performance requires that the reinforcement be maintained, is a poor means of general social control--to get people to behave well on their own. It is hoped that the present organization of these ideas suggests a strategy for making it more likely that people will behave well on their own.

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Footnotes

- ¹ Slightly modified from an address presented at the Western Psychological Association meetings, San Francisco, April, 1974.
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Table 1

Forms of Morally Relevant Behavior (Aggression or Altruism) classified according to degree of external reinforcement control, with corresponding individuated or deindividuated behaviors superimposed.

Morally Relevant Behavior	Instrumental (Tangible reinforcement)	Noninstrumental (self reinforcing)
Aggression	<u>Cue for deviance</u> Robbery Planned theft Organized crime Kidnapping 1st degree murder	<u>"Released" deindividuation</u> Impulsive theft Vandalism Destruction for "kicks"
Altruism	<u>Identity under scrutiny</u> Helping for pay, status, prestige, etc., or to avoid punishment	<u>"Pure" individuation</u> Helping for the fun of it.